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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
GLENDORA JACKSON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 7199
ARTHUR LARRON COLSTON ·a nd
MARY A. ZUPO, doing business
as POSTURE-FORM STUDIO, ·

Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah
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IN THE SUPREME COUR.T
of the State of Utah
GLENDO·RA JACKSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
c·ase No. 7199

ARTHUR LARRON COLSTON and
~IARY A. ZUPO, doing business
as POSTURE-FORM STUDIO,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT
In order to present more clearly the real issue
involved in this appeal, we add. to appe).Iant's general
"Statement of Facts'' the following:
Plaintiff alleged in her complaint (Tr. 3) that she
was ''severely burned in and about the left ankle and
left foot and in and about the right foot; that la.rge,
open sores and lesions developed as a result of said
burns * * * * *. '' The plaintiff testifieil; .at length as to
the taking of tre.atments but did not t:estify a:t .any time.
or in ,any way that she. expe:rienced any burn or p,aifn or

even discomfort during the treatments.
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The whole case of plaintiff is predicated upon a
statement alleged to have been made by defendant Mary
Zupo to the plaintiff on August 1, 1943, related by the
plaintiff in the following words. She said, referring to
Mary Zupo ( Tr. 89), '' Oh, yes, they h~d burned me,
and she was sorry.'' The defendant Mary Zupo was
not a doctor or a nurse but really a layman in the treatment and u.se of the lamps. The plaintiff testified, among
other things, that the lamps were placed 36 inches away
from her ankle (Tr. 78, 79), -and that she, the plaintiff,
never removed her shoes or stockings during any treatment. The plaintiff also testified (Tr. 83) that the heels
and toes were open, but the ankle didn't break open
until about the middle of May. The hole in the heel was
almost a complete split around the heel, and the toe was
like the flesh had been pried open (Tr. 84). Dr. Plumb, an
·expert witness on electricity, light and heat, examined
the lamps admittedly used by the defendant and testified
(Tr. 258, 259, 263) that the use of the lamps in the way
they were used could not produce a burn upon the plaintiff's leg.
The Court directed a verdict for the defendants on
the ground that the evidence did not show that the plaintiff was burned, or that the use of the lamps was the
proximate cause of the burn, and on the further ground
that under the evidence, the submission of the case to the
jury would leave the jury to speculate as to what did
cause the sore and the splitting and breaking out of
the flesh around the plaintiff's ankle and heel and toe.
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ARGUMENT
Counsel for appellant take the position that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable here. We
challenge this position on the g'Tound that the plaintiff
and the defendant together were using these lamps.
The plaintiff was conscious and free to move her foot
and was required to cooperate with the defendants in
the placing of the lamps with respect to plaintiff's foot
and the duration and manner of the use of the lamps.
The plaintiff did not testify that the lamps burned her
or that she suffered any burns at all. Counsel seek to
come in under the purported statement of Mary Zupo,
the operator, as plaintiff says Mary used the· words,
''Oh, yes, they had burned me, and she was sorry.''
Certainly Mary Zupo was not qualified as an expert to
testify to the burn as a fact. An unsworn extra-judicial
statement is of no greater effect.
On the question of what is meant by exclusive control, we direct the Court's attention to the following
cases:

Clark et ux vs. 1City of Bremerton, Washington,
97 Pac. (2d) 112.
Stanolind Oil !(/!; Gas ~co., vs. Bunce, W·yoming, 62
Pac. (2·d) 1297.
In this case the Court stated at page 1301:
''Of similar import are the essentials of the
doctrine as well phrased by Dean Wigmore, 5
Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) 498, S·ec. 2509,
thus:
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'(1) The apparatus must be such that in
the ordinary instance no injurious operation
is to be expected unless from a careless construction, inspection, or user; ( 2) Both inspection and user must have been at the time
of the injury in the control of· the party
charged; (3) The injurious occurrence or
condition must have happened irrespective
of any voluntary action at the time by the
party injured. '
''And the learned author supplements this
statement:
'It may he added that the particular force
and justice of the presumption, regarded as
a rule throwing upon the party charged the
duty of producing evidence, consists in the
circumstance that the chief evidence of the
true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is
practically accessible to him but inaccessible
to the injured person.' ''

Honea et al v·s. ·City Dairy, Inc., 140 P. (2d) 369.
Morrison vs. LeTournea;u Co. of Geo.rgia, 138 F.
(2d) 339.
The Court here at page 341 stated:
"It is urged that the pilot, LeTourneau, was
not licensed to carry passengers, and that he
violated the Federal regulations and statute in
that the pilot had only a private pilot's license
and was not authorized to take passengers aloft,
and that this constituted negligence per se. This
contention of appellant overlooks the further requisite that the violation of the statute must be
the proximate cause of the injury. The evidence
here wholly fails to show the proximate cause of
the injury, but leaves this- important issue entirely
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to conjecture and speculation.''

Brooks vs. Utah Hotel Co., 159 P. (2d) 127; 108
u. 220.
We challenge this claim on the further ground that
the purported statement of Mary Zupo, a mere layman,
is not and cannot be considered an admission of the
defendants that they injured or caused the injury to
the plaintiff's ankle. We again point out that the plaintiff never testified that she was burned, and the purported statement cannot be held as an admission or as
evidence that the defendants had burned the ankle of
the plaintiff. The statement does not refer to the ankle
and does not refer to any treatment, and lacks in time
and certainty so that there is no evidence of the cause
of the plaintiff's injury before the Court. The evidence
showed at one time an ulcerated condition of the ankle.
The evidence also showed split heel and split toe and
cracked flesh about the foot which was never exposed
to the heat and was always protected from the heat
by the shoe and the stocking.
The Court and the jury were then left to speculate
as to what did cause the sores and ulcerations on the
plaintiff's foot and ankle, and the Court was right in
refusing to submit the question of other possible causes
to the jury and leave them to so speculate.
The position of the appellant is challenged further
on the ground that under the undisputed evidence-and
the plaintiff made no effort of any kind to dispute the
testimony of Dr. Plumb-it was utterly impossible for
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these lamps-the only lamps used-placed as they were
and used as they were-to cause any burn of any kind
upon the plaintiff's foot. Dr. Plumb testified, after examining the two lamps involved (Exhibits 3 and 4, Tr.
255 ), as follows:

"Q. (by Mr. Coray): I ask you to look also at
this lamp, Dr. Plumb, on which I now have my
hand, and ask you if you have ever seen and
examined this lamp¥
A. I have examined both lamps today and
tested them.
THE COURT: They might to avoid confusion, they might be marked as exhibits even
though they are not left here and placed in the
exhibit room; they might he withdrawn.
MR. CORAY: We have no objection.
THE CO·URT: If that is marked Exhibit
"3" and that is marked Exhibit "4" then the
record will have some means of identifying the
two exhibits.
MR. CORAY: That is agreeable, Your Honor.
May the record show Miss Zupo identified
the lamps, Exhibit "3" now marked, as being the
lamp on the second table, and Exhibit "4" being
the lamp used on the third table.
THE COURT: I assume no objection to that.
MR. HANSON: If that is Jhe fact, -you
folks didn't offer them.
THE COURT: The record will show.
(Thereupon defendants' Exhibits '' 3''
and "4" are marked for identification.)
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Q. (by Mr. Coray): Now, Doctor, I ask you
to state if you will, \vhat your examination of
Exhibit "3" consisted, that is what you did in
the course of your examination of itf

A. I measured its power input, and roughly
its power output, its electro magnetic control;
it is not a lamp.
Q. Will you state whether or not you took the

object apart and examined the interiorf
A. I took it all apart and examined the inside to be sure it was in good working order.
Q. Will you tell the Court and Jury what is

contained inside of this object f
A. There is an annular coil of wire which
has a small iron core sticking out toward the
glass and when that is put on a lighting circuit,
120 v. lighting circuit it consumes about 100 watts
and makes a magnet.

Q. I see. Now, Doctor, does an object of that
type have any heating power, any burning power
whatsoever f.
A. Yes, it. has a slight amount of what is
called infra-red radiation of heat and that amount
would be less than 25 watts.
Q. So that I might understand you then, is

the amount of heat, or burning, or sensation which
is derived from that about equivalent to a 25 watt
globef
A. Or less.
Q. I see,-and what about the magnetic effect

that is produced by that object, what can you tell
about that, Doctorf
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A. It will pick up :sn;1all nails, hairpins, pins
and things of that sort.
Q. Do the magnetic forces which emanate
from· that lamp when it is running at full power,
have any detrimental effect on the human body1
MR. HANSON: If you know.
A. Say that again

pl~·ase.

Q. If you know, do you know whether the
magnetic forces which eni.anate from that lamp
have any effect on the human body~
A. I know they do not.

* * * :JI:
Q. (by Mr. Coray): Will you explain your
reason for your conclusion in that regard, D"Octor!
A. The total magnetic flux comes out of that
generator there, that coil would be less than the
total magnetic lines through a person's body
standing close to it, than the normal lines of force
traveling through their body from the north pole
to the south pole of this earth.
Q. Am I to understand then, Doctor, from
your testimony there are magnetic lines of force
running from the north pole to the south pole
that continuously go through a person's body on
this earth~
A. All the

~time,

day and night.

Q. And am I to understand the magnetic
force exerted in Exhibit "3" is less than the magnetic powers from the north to south pole~
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A. True.
Q. Doctor, from your examination of that
object, which we have called Exhibit "3", I ask
you to assume the following set of facts :
That over a period of app·roximately one
month a patient is placed, we Will say touching
the glass portion of this object, Exhibit "3 ", for
a period of app·roximately ten minutes on about
five or six-make it about eleven occasions, and
the lamp is turned on, or the object is turned on
with its full force and power, could, or do you
have an opinion whether or not Exhibit ''3''
could cause a burn upon that person~
A. My opinion is no.

Q. And will you tell us the reason for that
opinion, please, Doctor~
A. In ·the first place the magnetism would
not burn.

Q. Is there any other possibility of a burn
resulting from it~
A. And I told you before there is only a
small amount of heat comes out of that, less than
25 watts, and 25 watts two or three inches from
a person's body would not burn them.

Q. Now, from your examination, Doctor, is
there anything between the -coil contained in
Exhibit ''3'' and the glass which appears on the
front of it~
A. No, except a small piece of iron.

Q. What is this that renders the inside invisible from the outside~
A. A piece of paper, asbestos-by the way
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I think it is asbestos paper which could keep heat
from going into a person's body.

Q. Have you operated and turned this lamp
on, -Doctor~
A. Yes, and measured the power.

Q. After the lamp has been running for a
period of time, say fifteen minutes, is that ample
to maintain its maximum heat~
A. Yes.

Q. I will ask you to state whether or not it
is perceptible for a human hand or a person's
body in feeling the heat from the outside~
A. If you wanted to hold it there twenty or
thirty minutes you will feel a slight amount of
warmth, nothing more than a slight amount of
warmth.

* * * *

Q. (by Mr. Coray): Then, Doctor, I call your
attention to Exhibit "4", which I believe you
also examined~
A. Yes.

Q. And will you tell us what Exhibit "4" is
please., Doctor~
A. It is an ordinary infra-red heat lamp.

Q. Did you make measurements as to theA. Input.

Q. -input and output energy of

that~

A. At the normal voltage that is here in the
building the input-or any here in town-the input on that is not over 240 watts, and it has a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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controller on so you can turn that down to much
less than that.
Q. The maximum intake is 240 watts'

A. Maximum.
Q. Yes.

A. And with the controller you can turn that
down to about 100 watts.
Q. How does that controller work to control
voltage?

A. Resistance rheostat in the back of th.e
lamp with an adjustable handle on it.
Q. Now, Doctor, how does this lamp, Exhibit
"4", compare with other devices that we are
commonly familiar with, can you give us any comparison so we can understand about how much
power that is'

A. I have brought along a few lamps, I have
put on the table; the first one at the west is
the largest one, that is 1000 watts.

* * * *
Q. Now, I ask you, Doctor, if you are able
to compare the a.mount of energy heat which
comes out of Exhibit "4" with the amount of
energy that comes out of the sun as felt on this
earth'
A. The amount of energy which in the summer time shines on your body as infra-red radiation from the sun, if you are outdoors, would be
more than the amount of that energy that comes
Q. By that you mean Exhibit ''4'''
out of that unit there.
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A. Yes.
Q. So then am I to understand, Doctor, that
you are more likely to suffer a burn from having
been in the sunlight on a summer day for ten
minutes, than you are to be under the lamp Exhibit '' 4'' for the same p·eriod of time~

A. Correct.
Q. Now, Doctor, I ask you to assume the
following facts: That a woman goes to a studio
for treatment, that for over a period of approximately one month, on eleven separate occasions,
she is placed under this lamp, Exhibit '' 4' ', with
the lamp at a distance of approximately two feet
from her body and with the rays of the lamp
shining directly on the top of her ankles,-and I
ask; you to assume that i~ all, except the last one
or two of those eleven trips, she wore her shoes
and on all occasions she wore . stockings which
were not removed, and those treatments took
place never oftener than every other day, and
some at intervals of four or five days between
them.

Do you have an opinion whether or not this
lamp, Exhibit "4" could cause a burn upon the
flesh or p·erson of that lady~
A. I would say a normal person's flesh could
not be burned especially when you consider the
shoe and the stockings which are both non-conductors, tending to stop the radiation from coming in.''
The mere statement claimed by the plaintiff, Mrs.
Jackson, to have been made by the defendant Zupo, as
she testified: '' Oh, yes, they had burned me, and she
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was sorry,'' is not, in the face of the physical facts as
to the location and use of the lamp·s by the defendant
and the testimony of Dr. Plumb, which stands wholly
undisputed, substantial evidence. This is especially true
when it is considered that defendant Zupo was wholly
without sufficient medical training to recognize a burn
by the lamp, if in fact there was any burn. We direct
the Court's attention to the case of H aarstritch v·s. Oregon Short Line, 70 Utah, 552, 262· Pac. 100, at page 562,
the Court said :
''The most pointed evidence on the part of
the plaintiff as to when the freight car came into
view is that of the witness Howlett, who testified
that he first saw the car when it reached the
center of the street railway track and that the
automobile was then within 15 or 20 feet of the
crossing. It only need be stated here that the
testimony of Mr. Howlett in that resp·ect flies in
the face of uncontroverted physical facts and
therefore is not substantial evidence.''
With this as the only testimony before it, the jury
(as to the use of the lamps and this being wholly undenied) could but only speculate as to what did cause
the sores and ulcers on the plaintiff's ankle and foot,
and such evidence could under no possible theory sustain a verdict or finding that the use of the lamps was
the proximate cause of the injury. Under such circumstances, the Court could only direct a verdict for the
defendants, and it would have been a clear error to have
submitted the case to the jury for speculation. We direct
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the Court's attention in support of this proposition to
the following Utah cases:
Reid V'S. R:ailroad, 39 Utah 617.
In this ease the Court said at page 621:
"It is a familiar rule that where the undisputed evidence of the plaintiff, from which the
existence of an essential fact is sought to be inferred, points with equal force to two things, one
of which renders the defendant liable and the
other not, the plaintiff must fail. So in this case,
in order to entitle respondent to recover it was
essential for her to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the cow entered upon the right
of way through the broken down fence. This the
respondent failed to do."

Richards vs. Railroad ~Company, 41 Utah 99.
In this case the Court considered to what extent,
from the fact that a train struck the horses found killed
on the tract, negligence could he inferred, and whether
the inference followed from the mere killing that the
engineer had an opportunity to stop the train, and there
was, therefore, negligence, and then stated at page 109:
"No doubt negligence may be inferred, but
there must be some fact or facts from which the
inference may be deduced. But, assuming that
respondent could rely upon the inferences referred to for the purpose of making out a prima
facie case of negligence, were not those inferences
fully met and overthrown by positive and unchallenged evidence produced on behalf of appellant¥
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''If this be true, then this case comes squarely
within the rule announced by this court in the case
of Christensen v. R.ailroad Co., 35 Utah, 137, 99
·Pac. '676, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 255, 18 Ann. Cas. 1159.

In that case the rule is stated in the seventh headnote thu·s:
'Inferential evidence of negligence is
overcome by defendant's undisputed testimony showing that there was no negligence;
and, where plaintiff's case rests entirely on
such inferential evidence, the case must be
taken from the jury.'
"In Goss v. N.P. Ry. Co., 48 Or. 439, 87 Pac.
149, the rule is stated in the following language:

'Where the evidence of negligence is entirely inferential, and the testimony for the
defendant is clear and undisputed to the
effect that there was no negligence, the plaintiff's case is overcome as a matter of law,
and it becomes the duty of the judge to take
the case from the jury.' ''
The appellant asked the Court to infer that the use
of the lamp caused the ulcer and splitting of plaintiff's
heel and toe, which were always protected and never
exposed to the lamp.

Haarstritch vs. 0. 8. L., 70 Utah 552.
The case of Peterson V'S. Richards, 73 Utah 59, 272
Pac. 229,. is clearly distinguished. In that case there
was no question as to the crushing of the hand of plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff. There was no question of proximate cause. The
only question was as to whether the injury occurred in
the operating room. Here the existence of an ankle
ulcer is proven, the cause is not shown, and the Court
refused to ask the jury to speculate as to the cause.
We respectfully submit that there was no error
in the ruling of the Court and that the judgment of the
trial Court should be in all respects affirmed.

CLYDE & CORAY,
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY,
Attorneys for D-efendarnts
and Respondents
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